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ABSTRACT 
The fundamental thesis of Benedetto Croce’s Aesthetic consists of two main points: (i) in-
tuitive knowledge is independent of logical knowledge, (ii) intuitive knowledge is given in 
art, while logical knowledge in philosophy.
After illustrating some theoretical elements that make Croce’s aesthetic a focal point in 
contemporary aesthetics, in the present article I will show how, given the validity of the first 
part of Croce’s thesis (i), the second part of his thesis (ii) is not defensible in the terms pro-
posed by him. Finally, on the basis on the previous analyses, I shall offer some arguments in 
favour of maintaining the disciplinary distinction between aesthetics and philosophy of art.
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PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE
Certain “impossible” books have left an important mark in the history of phi-
losophy. Among the most famous, there certainly is The Birth of Tragedy. Its 
very author, Friedrich Nietzsche, was self-critical about it, calling the book – 
which had brought him deep bitterness both at a scientific and at a personal 
1 English translation by Sarah De Sanctis.
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level – an “impossible book”2. In the third edition of his Aesthetic, Croce 
looked back at his own work, moved by a feeling in some ways similar to 
Nietzsche’s.
Perhaps not all of the Aesthetic is an impossible book, but certainly – as 
pointed out by Luigi Russo in his study dedicated to it3 – a part of it is, namely 
the section devoted to the History of aesthetics. After all, it is impossible by 
Croce’s own admission: in a moment of self-criticism, in the notes to the fifth 
edition, the philosopher emphasised that his History is covered by a certain 
“perspective aberration”4 in dealing with the matter, due to the fact that such 
a “History” had been thought of as a kind of “armed wing” of the first part of 
the book, that is, Theory. “Besides – writes Croce – the aim of that historical 
part was not so much historical as controversial”5. Here Croce, so to speak, 
was philosophising with an axe – or with a hammer, if we wish to further pur-
sue the analogy with Nietzsche – making sure that history would pave the way 
for theory; an attitude which professional historians would obviously hardly 
consent to. Now, if the “History” presented in the Aesthetic is impossible, it 
must be said that the “Theory” is not that much different. What I would like 
to suggest, though, is that, despite the difficulties in following Croce in the 
positive development of his thesis, the problems he poses are still open and 
extremely interesting.
So let’s start from the beginning, from what is perhaps the most outdated 
idea of Croce’s: his conception of philosophy which, in effect, constitutes 
a whole (philosophical) programme. 
The author, especially in the theoretical part, has expanded his treatment to cover more 
general questions that border upon the subject with which he is dealing. But this will 
not seem a digression to anyone who remembers that strictly speaking there are no 
separate and self-sufficient philosophical disciplines. Philosophy is unity; so then when 
dealing with the Aesthetic or Logic or Ethics one is always dealing with the whole of 
philosophy, even though, for didactic purposes, one may be highlighting a particular 
aspect of that indivisible unity6. 
2 F. Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, Leipzig, Neumann 1872; English translation 
Birth Of Tragedy Or Hellenism And Pessimism, George Allen W Unwin Ltd., London 
1909, p. 5. 
3 L. Russo, Una storia per l’estetica, Aesthetica Preprint, Palermo 1988. 
4 B. Croce, Estetica come scienza della espressione e linguistica generale, Laterza, 
Roma – Bari 1902, p. viii. My translation.
5 Ibidem. My translation.
6 Ibidem, p. iv (English translation: idem, The Aesthetic as the Science of Expression 
and of the Linguistic in General, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1992, p. xxvii). 
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The increasingly specialised style adopted by philosophy throughout the 
twentieth century and still used today seems de facto to prove Croce wrong. 
He understood philosophy as a global construction or, if you prefer, as a whole 
where each part is in a deep relationship with the other. Some time ago, be-
fore the term became outdated, one would have said that philosophy can be 
thought of only in a systematic way. Systematic philosophies have received 
much criticism, though, most of which is worthy of attention. The most com-
mon critique, which has in turn characterised the structure of many postmod-
ernist philosophies, is that against the metaphysical configuration underlying 
systematic philosophy. 
In fact – as has been well noted by the philosophies that, for various rea-
sons, have discussed and condemned relativisms and scepticisms of various 
kinds – it is one thing to be aware of the epistemological limitations of the con-
structions we work on, but to engage in relativistic or even sceptical positions 
is another thing. Philosophical analysis cannot help but assume metaphysical 
presuppositions; what it can do, if anything, is either to make these assump-
tions explicit and declare them or, a little slyly, hide them by pretending they 
are not there.
When analysis and criticism are not followed by a construction (i.e. a sys-
tem, a whole worldview that seeks on the one hand to clarify the meaning of 
the various aspects of the reality in which we dwell and, on the other hand, to 
apply this analysis to the historical concreteness of the world we live in so as 
to make it ethically and politically integrated) one wonders what philosophy 
really is and what it is for. This work, which responds to a profound vocation 
of philosophy, cannot be done without the adoption of a perspective capable 
of integrating different levels: it requires the adoption of a perspective that 
intends to be systematic.
Croce perfectly captures this point where he notes that aesthetics is no ex-
ception. This means, very simply, that it is not possible to think and develop 
the disciplinary field of aesthetics, as well as that of any other philosophical 
discipline, prescinding from the general corpus of philosophy. As for Croce’s 
argument, which I consider well-founded even though outdated, it is impor-
tant to emphasise that not only should aesthetics not be separated from the 
corpus of general philosophy, but it should also work together with all the 
disciplines that deal with issues that relate in various ways to the domain of 
epistemology.
Here lies Croce’s continuing relevance: in having considered aesthetics 
as a proper part of epistemology, in other words as a discipline that has as its 
fundamental objective the clarification of the ways of knowledge. The opening 
12 Tiziana Andina 
of the Aesthetic is paradigmatic because it distinguishes intuitive knowledge 
and logical knowledge:
Knowledge takes two forms; it is either intuitive knowledge or logical knowledge; 
knowledge obtained by means of our power to create mental representations, or knowl-
edge obtained by means of the intellect; knowledge of individuals, or knowledge of 
universals; of particular things, or of the relationships between them; it is, in short, 
either that which produces representations or that which produces concepts7.
While logical knowledge is in excellent health, intuitive knowledge – Croce un-
derlines – is doing much worse: in addition to having low autonomy, placed as 
it is under the close protection of logical thought, it has also been less fortunate, 
having a more modest development. Without there really being a reason for it:
Now the first point to fix firmly in one’s mind is that intuitive knowledge has no need 
of masters; it has no need to lean on anyone; it does not have to ask for the loan of 
anyone else’s eyes since it has perfectly adequate eyes in its own head. And although it 
is incontestable that in many intuitions one can find an admixture of concepts, in others 
there is no trace of any such admixture: which proves that such a thing is not essential. 
The impression of moonlight, depicted by a painter; the contours of a country, drawn 
by a cartographer; a tender or dynamic musical motif; the words of a plaintive lyric, or 
those with which we ask for things, give orders or make complaints in everyday life, 
can all perfectly well be intuitions, without any trace of reference to the intellectual8. 
The examples presented by Croce are not too straightforward, so he some-
what clarifies what he means below:
The concepts that are to be found mixed and fused with intuitions, insofar as they re-
ally are thus mixed and fused, are no longer concepts, having lost any independence 
and autonomy. They were, indeed, once concepts, but have now become simply com-
ponents of intuitions. Philosophical maxims, put into the mouth of a tragic or comic 
character, there hold the office not of concepts, but of characteristics of such persons; 
in the same way that the red in a painted figure does not function like the concept of 
the colour red as it is used by physicists, but as a characterizing element in that figure. 
[…] A work of art can be full of philosophical concepts, it can have them in greater 
abundance, and they can be more profound than those found in a philosophical trea-
tise, which, in its turn, may be rich to overflowing with descriptions and intuitions. 
But, notwithstanding all those concepts, the net result in the case of a work of art is an 
intuition; and, notwithstanding all those intuitions, the net result in the case of a phil-
osophical treatise is a concept9.
7 Ibidem, p. 3 (English translation: p. 1). 
8 Ibidem, p. 4 (English translation: p. 2). 
9 Ibidem, p. 4–5 (English translation: p. 2–3). 
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In the application of his distinction between intuitions and concepts, in 
fact, Croce is rather Manichean: even if art overflowed with concepts and 
philosophy with intuitions, by the mere fact that a concept finds artistic expres-
sion, it would still become an intuition; while, inversely, if an intuition found 
philosophical expression, it would become a concept. It also seems that in-
tuitions and concepts are put by the philosopher on a hypothetical line that 
goes from the concrete to the abstract, that is, from the sensible to the intel-
lectual, and that they are poles apart from each other. Furthermore – this is 
the second part of Croce’s thesis – art, by its own nature, can only express 
intuitions, while in philosophy there are only concepts.
Thus, Croce’s thesis is made up of two parts: i) intuitive knowledge is 
independent of logical knowledge; ii) intuitive knowledge is given in art, and 
logical knowledge in philosophy. To summarise, we could put it as follows: 
aesthetics is the science that deals with that part of knowledge which is not 
yet structured by the intervention of the intellect (that is, in Croce’s language, 
intuitions) and with how it is expressed.
In what follows, I will try to illustrate two points: to begin with, that the first 
part of Croce’s thesis (i.e. point i.) is in all respects the horizon of contemporary 
aesthetics. I will then move away from Croce with regard to an issue that I deem 
important: I will try to show how, precisely because of the validity of Croce’s 
starting point, the second part of his thesis (i.e., point ii.) is not defensible in 
the terms in which Croce puts it. I will argue, finally, that it is good to preserve 
the distinction between aesthetics and the philosophy of art, leaving to the latter 
the study of those things that we are used to classify as „works of art” and con-
sidering, conversely, aesthetics in all respects as a proper part of epistemology.
AESTHETICS AS KNOWLEDGE
Let us turn to point i., namely to intuitions and their expressions. In order to 
illustrate his idea, Croce refers, among other things, to the “impression of 
moonlight, depicted by a painter”. I would like to note a preliminary point. In 
the passage I reported, Croce considers the impression of moonlight perceived 
by any observer the same way as the impression of moonlight depicted  by 
a painter – say, the one painted in 1869 by Édouard Manet in Clair de lune sur 
le port de Boulogne. Or better: he only considers the impression that is em-
bedded into some kind of expression, i.e. precisely the impression that Manet 
gives of his moonlight in 1869, as an impression that it is a harbinger of the 
illogical knowledge mentioned in the opening of Croce’s treatise.
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Croce’s thesis is well known, but it is worth reviewing quickly here: an 
impression, in order to be such and to distinguish itself from a sensation or 
a perception, must be at one with its expression. In other words, I can very 
well be in the presence of moonlight, perceive it, have some feeling of it. All 
this, however, for Croce, remains a rather obscure matter and is certainly not 
an object of knowledge. Conversely, the sensation of that moonlight becomes 
the first moment of knowledge (and therefore an intuition) when I know how 
to give adequate expression to that sensation, perhaps – if I were a painter – 
on the canvas.
However, in order to have a correct and precise notion about intuition it is not enough 
to recognise that it is independent of the conceptual. Among those who recognise this, 
or who, at any rate, don’t explicitly make intuition dependent on the operations of the 
intellect, another error appears which obscures and confuses its true nature. Intuition 
is frequently understood as perception, that is to say, as the knowledge of what has 
actually happened, the apprehension of something as a real thing. Certainly perception 
is intuition […] But, as much an intuition is the picture that is now passing through my 
mind of a me that writes in a different room, in another city […]. Which means that 
the distinction between what is real and what is not is to be made only after intuition 
has occurred and is extrinsic to the true nature of intuition10.
Therefore, it makes no difference whether the moonlight is perceived or 
the perception of moonlight is rather remembered. In both cases we are dealing 
with an intuition. Rather, the question that Croce attempts to answer is roughly 
this: what kind of knowledge is that which comes to me from the intuition of 
moonlight that finds expression in Manet’s painting? He assumes, obviously, 
that there is a distinction between the dictionary definition of moonlight (logi-
cal knowledge) and the artistic expression of moonlight (intuitive knowledge); 
while, on the contrary, assuming that an ordinary intuition of moonlight – the 
kind available to any normal subject in terms of perceptual capacity – is not in 
any way a moment of knowledge, if it is not accompanied by its expression:
Intuitive activity intuits only insofar as it expresses. If this proposition sounds para-
doxical, one reason for that lies without doubt in the tendency to give too restricted 
a meaning to the term “expression”, using it only of those expressions that are called 
“verbal expressions”; whereas there exist also nonverbal expressions, like those con-
stituted by lines, colours and tones; all of which are to be included in the notion of 
expression, which therefore encompasses every kind of product of man, - orator, mu-
sician, painter or whatever11. 
10 Ibidem, p. 5–6 (English translation: p. 3). 
11 Ibidem, p. 11 (English translation: p. 9).
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Now, there are good theoretical reasons to argue that in the construction of 
this argument, Croce’s analysis has maintained too coarse a level of granulari-
ty. Does ordinary intuition of moonlight (the one that is not accompanied by an 
expression) really not fall in the first form of knowledge identified by Croce?
Let us try to put the issue in different terms and wonder what difference 
there is between the intuition of moonlight that overwhelms me in an August 
evening and that does not find any artistic expression, the “moonlight” painted 
by Manet and the definition of moonlight regulating in some way the knowl-
edge our naive conceptions refer to.
MOONLIGHTS
Moonlight is moonlight: that is, it is a particular lighting condition of the envi-
ronment, a night glow or luminosity, which makes the atmosphere suspended, 
perhaps a bit mysterious. It is, Croce argues, something more than just a sen-
sation or a perception. However, this “something more” only gives itself by 
means of the expression of that intuition. That is, I have to give shape to that 
intuition, externalise it, make it somehow shareable for it to constitute the first 
moment of knowledge. Maybe a little curiously, Croce tied this externalisation 
of our intuitions to artistic expression: paintings, sculptures, musical works, 
works of words. Hence the importance of art for aesthetics.
So: an intuition can be a perception or a memory and it is essentially an 
expression. An intuition so conceived – that is, an essentially expressive in-
tuition – is a form of our knowledge. In the moonlight there is no concept, at 
least in the first instance, when we perceive and discriminate it as a particular 
environmental situation. And, underlines Croce, there is no concept or, perhaps 
more properly, the concept is not the prevalent element, also in Manet’s painting.
One wonders why expression is such an important element in Croce’s ar-
gument. I suspect that there is no real reason, but that such a choice rather de-
pends on Croce’s project to tie aesthetics and art – a move that does not seem 
necessary neither to Croce’s project in particular nor, even less, to aesthetics 
as a discipline. Specifically, Croce thus has to support two rather unusual the-
ses: a) that intuition devoid of expression is not a cognitive activity; b) that art 
brings with it no conceptual elements. Or, rather, that, even if such elements 
presented themselves, they would be completely reabsorbed into the intuition, 
which is actual non-conceptual knowledge.
Consider, therefore, the first part of Croce’s thesis, returning to the simple 
perception of moonlight which, according to Croce, can become an intuition if 
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expressed in a picture à la Manet, in a symphony à la Beethoven and perhaps 
in the description of a battle à la Homer. What happens, then, when we are in 
the presence of moonlight and we perceive it without painting it or putting it 
into music? 
In the situation that typically fascinates our poetic imagination, we would 
happen to be in a special environment: it would be night, yet we would be 
able to quite distinctly perceive the surface of certain objects. The light is not 
the usual hot one of the sun. It is rather a cool, white light which we associate 
with discrete emotional tones. Much of the charm that we feel when we see 
moonlight obviously depends on the light. Perceiving the light of the moon 
that illuminates the surfaces of the environment is a completely different feel-
ing from the one linked to the perception of sunlight. Much, Gibson would 
say, depends on that very light that is not a blank medium:
Only insofar as ambient light has structure does it specify the environment. I mean by 
this that the light at the point of observation has to be different in different directions 
(or there have to be differences in different directions) in order for it to contain any in-
formation. The differences are principally differences of intensity. The term that will be 
used to describe ambient light with structure is an ambient optic array. This implies an 
arrangement of some sort, that is, a pattern, a texture, or a configuration. The ambient 
light cannot be homogenous or blank12. 
Gibson’s thesis is that such ambient light, i.e. the ambient light that we iden-
tify as “moonlight”, tells us a great deal and is rich in information. For this rea-
son, probably, art is so much interested in it. That, of course, does not mean that 
it is what it is only insofar as it finds expression. Far from it. The light of the 
moonlight, similarly to what happens to the daylight we are more accustomed 
to, is “structured” by nature. In other words, this means that it carries a wealth of 
information for all the living beings who perceive it. Otherwise, in the presence 
of moonlight, we would be moving in an amorphous and diaphanous structure, 
similar to the most opaque kind of fog:
In the case of unstructured ambient light, an environment is not specified and no infor-
mation about an environment is available. Since the light is undifferentiated, it cannot 
be discriminated, and there is no information in any meaning of that term. The ambient 
light in this respect is no different from ambient darkness. An environment could exist 
behind the fog or the darkness, or nothing could exist; either alternative is possible13.
12 J. J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Hillsdale (NJ.) – Lon-
don, Erlbaum 1986, p. 51.
13 Ibidem.
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The perceptual activity, as Gibson describes it, is a-conceptual to the ex-
tent that there is no need for human beings to give shape to stimuli in order 
to structure the outside world: light, substances, surfaces, layouts, are all ele-
ments loaded with information about the world environment. Once we become 
familiar with a different way of conceptualising the environment – a way that, 
for instance, does not follow the categories dictated by classical physics that 
generally speaks of bodies in space – then regarding the terrestrial world as 
a world of substances, media and surfaces that separate each from the other 
will lead to considerable theoretical advantages (if by profession we are not 
physicians, but we are rather interested in the methods of our knowledge). 
Then we will say that the media are, for example, air and water; they allow 
both for the movement and for the passage of light. Conversely, the part of the 
environment that does not allow for the movement is substance. Finally, we 
could introduce in our basic ontology what separates substances and media: 
surfaces. Until substances change or at least change in a relevant manner – in 
Gibson’s jargon, until they persist – their surfaces also persist and have a lay-
out, a stable conformation. None of this would hold without yet another im-
portant phenomenon: what Gibson calls the reflection of light in the medium. 
Light is partly absorbed, partly reflected by the surfaces, and this obviously 
depends on the chemical composition of the substances:
In our concern with surfaces and their purely geometric layout, we must not forget that 
the air is filled with sunlight during the day and that some illumination always remains, 
even during the night. This fact, too, is an invariant of nature. Light comes from the 
sky and becomes ambient in the air. This is what makes persisting surfaces potentially 
visible as well as potentially tangible14.
In this context, Gibson can argue that perception is something different 
from mere sensible stimulation: more properly, it is “information pickup”15. 
Not always is such pickup accompanied by perceptual awareness, but in some 
cases this happens. In these cases perception is the basic, fundamental and 
indispensable element of our knowledge: a collection of information that we 
need first of all to dwell in the world, and secondly in order to know it.
How many things are we told by the light, substances, surfaces and layouts 
of that part of the world environment we see under moonlight? We are told, 
for example, that if there were only the moon, our days would be marked by 
a softer light and that bodies would remain partially submerged in the dark; we 
14 Ibidem, p. 23.
15 Ibidem, p. 238 ff. 
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are also told that the world would have few colours, rather cool and sometimes 
icy. And someone – perhaps Beethoven – should perhaps compose a piece of 
music to heat those tones of white and blue.
We have come to the second moonlight, the painted one that, for Croce, 
has all the trappings of the first occurrence of knowledge. Following Gibson 
once again, I propose a more detailed distinction than that offered by Croce. 
Somehow Gibson distinguishes drawing from the artwork itself (i.e. the ar-
tistic object to which we attribute aesthetic or, more generally, artistic prop-
erties). Drawing, in particular, is for Gibson a typical cognitive activity to 
the extent that at stake there is not a process of depiction or representation of 
reality, but a method of detection and re-proposition of some invariants that 
the subject – so to speak – “extracts” from reality as well as from memory, in 
order to present them in the work. Drawing is, in this sense, really knowing 
rather than copying.
By gradual stages human children begin to draw in the full meaning of the term – to 
raw a man or a woman, a house, a flower or the sun in the sky. […] [The child] delin-
eates for himself and others something he has apprehended or experienced. The traces 
he leaves on the paper are not just lines, or the outlines of forms, but the distinguishing 
features of the environment. While drawing he may be looking at something real, or 
thinking about something real, or thinking about something wholly imaginary; in any 
case, the invariants of his visual system are resonating. The same is true of the artist as 
of the child. The invariants are not abstractions or concepts. They are not knowledge; 
they are simply invariants16.
Gibson is basically telling us that the activity of drawing what we do, 
whether we are beginners or professionals, means selecting some elements 
of the structure of the external world, selecting them and shaping them into 
a whole that will be original and devoid of any mimetic or representational 
purpose in relation to that part of the world that is poured on canvas, music 
sheet, or on any other media.
I insist that what the draftsman, beginner or expert, actually does is not to replicate, to 
print, or to copy in any sense of the term but to mark the surface in such a way as to 
display invariants and record an awareness. Drawing is never copying. It is impossible 
to copy a piece of the environment. Only another drawing can be copied. We have been 
misled for too long by the fallacy that a picture is similar to what it depicts, a likeness, 
or an imitation of it. A picture supplies some of the information for what it depicts, 
but that does not imply that it is in projective correspondence with what it depicts17. 
16 Ibidem, p. 278.
17 Ibidem, p. 279.
 What Still Stands of Croce’s Aesthetic 19
We have now come to the point. Perception has nothing conceptual in it-
self, in the sense that it is not an activity that must be thought of in terms of the 
construction of sense-data functional to a perceptual scheme. Rather, it must be 
thought of along the lines of information pickup: perceiving subjects derives 
from the ambient optic array some information about the invariant structures of 
that array. The same information constitutes sufficient and necessary material 
to allow the perceiver to dwell in the world. This is more or less what happens 
when we perceive moonlight: perceiving it, we know many things regarding 
that specific ambient optic array, without – contrary to what Croce thought – 
it being in any way necessary to express anything of that perceptual activity.
It may then happen that someone decides to draw that same moonlight. 
What happens in this case – whether this is done while being surrounded by 
the lunar atmosphere or the next day in bright sunlight – is a selection or 
a recollection from memory of some constitutive features of that specific am-
bient array. For moonlight to be recognised as moonlight it does not have to 
be imitated or copied. Rather, we must choose the invariant elements of the 
“moonlight” optic array that define it as such: to draw is “to mark the surface 
in such a way as to display invariants and record an awareness”.
Now, one might wonder whether in Clair de lune sur le port de Boulogne 
there is nothing but this; that is, whether Manet’s painting is nothing but the 
choice of invariants knowingly recorded on canvas. The hypothesis is that it is 
right here that one should find the gap that exists between a simple expressive 
activity (the drawing of moonlight) and an artistic activity. The second can-
not be reduced to the first, since it expresses a more detailed conceptuality. In 
a word, there are different kinds of awareness and it is reasonable to assume 
that Manet’s is much different from that expressed by a child who draws his 
moonlight, and from that expressed, say, by a student of the Art Academy.
Manet’s painting style, in its early stages, was distinguished by the fact 
that it expressed a realism without frills, inspired as it was by the master 
Gustave Courbet. The reference to classical painting in his early works is 
obvious. The turning point in Manet’s art – the turning point that led critics 
to regard him as one of the first Impressionist painters even if, in fact, Manet 
never exhibited with the other Impressionists – took place in 1863 with The 
Luncheon on the Grass (1862–1863). In this work, Manet abandons the tools 
of chiaroscuro and perspective altogether to use evenly spread colour spots. 
He retains, instead, the spatial simulation that the eye still manages to catch if 
the observer is at some distance from the canvas.
The later works marked, on a technical level, an even more substantial 
and profound break with the past. In many of them, however, Manet plays 
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with tradition and history of art, unfolding in this way a rich conceptuality. 
Both Olympia (1863) and The Luncheon on the Grass (1862–1863) explicitly 
refer to Titian’s subjects. Olympia, in particular, a well-known Parisian pros-
titute portrayed in a vulgar effrontery, overturns the symbolism of The Venus 
of Urbino (1538), the painting by Titian which directly inspired Manet. The 
Balcony (1868–1869) quotes an analogous subject painted by Goya, who is 
also the source (The Third of May 1808) of Manet’s Execution of Emperor 
Maximilian (1867). From Velazquez (Las meminas) he derives the visions 
reflected in the mirror behind the bar tender in A bar at the Folies-Bergère 
(1881–1882), and so forth.
Manet’s dialogue with the artistic tradition is continuous and tight, which 
means that his works do not only express the particular way in which the artist 
gathers information from the outside world and expresses the invariants of his 
“moonlight”. It means that the works of Manet bear the concrete mark of the 
artistic tradition that preceded his own, of the way he read the works of the 
past: his works dialogue with that tradition, cite it while modifying it deeply in 
the stylistic forms and ways of representing the world. We find a rich universe 
of meanings in this way of dealing with the past; these meanings, using am 
absolutely new style, convey certain parts of Manet’s present.
If we fail to understand this – as Croce seems to be doing in his Aesthetic – 
we fail to understand the difference between the perception of moonlight, the 
drawing of the moonlight perceived or remembered and Clair de lune sur le 
port de Boulogne. There is a whole (conceptual) world in Manet that makes 
the difference between perception and its expression on the one hand, and the 
works of art on the other.
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